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Abstract  
 
The fiscal incentives literature emphasizes how the design of transfer systems has a 
significant implication on the behavior of local governments within decentralized systems. 
The empirical findings on the relationship between intergovernmental transfers and the 
incentives they create for local revenue generation are inconclusive and differ from country 
to country. Given the lack of data on local public finances, this type of study rarely involves 
developing countries. Using a unique and rich socio-economic and public finance data 
covering a large set of Moroccan municipalities over the period 2005 to 2009, this paper 
contributes to the new generation of fiscal federalism literature by assessing the fiscal 
incentive effects of two types of transfers: general purpose transfers (unconditional) defined 
by a formula and specific purpose transfers (conditional) allocated on an ad-hoc basis. After 
correcting for the endogeneity problem, our findings support the existence of a significant 
incentive effect of unconditional transfers and a less robust effect of conditional transfers. 
Suggesting that transfers from the central government complement local own revenues by 
encouraging Moroccan municipalities to collect more revenues. 
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INTRODUCTION 
 
Decentralization is one approach adopted by both developed and developing countries in last decades to 
meet the challenges of development. It aims to endow local governments with more autonomy through 
significant revenue raising capacity. Fiscal decentralization is seen as a way to improve public sector 
performance by increasing local financial management efficiency and by making government more 
accountable. Moreover, heterogeneous preferences of citizens are more likely to be revealed, as well as 
addressed, by officials that are closer and more accountable to constituents than remotely located officials 
(Oates, 1972). 
In a decentralized system, central government devolves expenditure tasks to subnational governments that 
sometimes exceed their capacity to raise own revenues, thus creating a problem of vertical imbalance. 
Local governments face different costs for providing public services and for raising own revenues. 
Moreover, most local governments lack the administrative ability to raise revenues. It results in horizontal 
imbalance between expenditure and revenue; governments at the same level cannot always face their 
assigned expenditures and responsibilities relying only on their own revenues.  
The standard literature on fiscal federalism
1
 (FGFF) emphasizes the importance of transfers for mitigating 
vertical and horizontal imbalances and discusses the optimal design of these transfers and their appropriate 
amount. It studies the performance of decentralized systems under the assumption that each level of 
government would seek to maximize the social welfare of its respective constituency. These vertical and 
horizontal gaps can be filled either by giving local governments more revenue raising responsibility or by 
adopting redistributive transfers. The first option is often difficult to implement, firstly because tax bases 
and the capacity to raise revenues are different among local jurisdictions, thus decentralization will 
inevitably worsen the horizontal imbalance. Second, the central government has a greater capacity to 
assess some tax bases and then collect these taxes than local governments. Consequently, these revenues 
are more costly and inefficiently collected at a local level. Equalizing transfers are another way to 
compensate for these imbalances by insuring that the revenues and expenditures at each level are equal, 
with larger transfers to local governments having lower tax capacity (Dahlby, 1996). Therefore, a 
substantial share of local revenues often comes from these transfers. The ‘benefit principle’ of taxation 
according to which local governments should rely on local taxes to be more effective and accountable is 
weaken by these transfers. Thus, one cannot design an appropriate decentralized system without 
simultaneously designing an appropriate system of intergovernmental transfers.  
                                                        
1
 The standard literature refers to the First Generation Fiscal Federalism (FGFF) which addressed the issues of 
equalizing transfers from the central government to local governments focusing on the normative public finance 
goals: allocation efficiency, equity in distribution, and stabilization (Bird, 2010) 
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Intergovernmental transfers can be classified into two categories: general-purpose (unconditional) and 
specific-purpose (conditional or earmarked) transfers2. The amount to be transferred can be defined in four 
ways: as a tax sharing transfer, according to which a predetermined share of central taxes is allocated to 
local governments; according to a formula based on some specific criteria; in an ad-hoc way where the 
amount to be transferred is discretionarily decided; through cost reimbursement meaning that the central 
government cover the expenditures faced by the local government in providing some services. In practice, 
most countries use a mix of these four ways, as in the case of Morocco, which is the focus of this paper. 
Unconditional transfers are allocated without any conditionality on local expenditures. This kind of 
transfer is provided as budget support, increasing the financial resources of the local government. 
Unconditional transfers augment the local government’s resources and thus relax its budget constraint, 
enabling the local government to extend its provision of public goods and services or to provide tax relief. 
By contrast, conditional transfers are funding specific projects; they intend to stimulate expenditures in 
specific areas. They can be matching or nonmatching, meaning that the central government match the 
funds to some degree (matching) or cover all the expenditures supported by the local government (non-
matching). Conditional transfers increase the financial resources of the local government like 
unconditional transfers, but limits local public policies choices leading to “unwanted” public investments 
(Boadway and Shah 2007).  
Choosing between conditional and unconditional transfers is a major public policy choice as each type of 
transfer gives the local government different incentives regarding public expenditures and revenue 
mobilization. 
Second generation fiscal federalism (SGFF) complements the FGFF by studying how the prescriptions of 
FGFF should be adapted given fiscal and political incentives facing local officials (Weingast, 2014).  
SGFF developed the “fiscal incentives approach” which highlights the importance of institutions for 
revenue generation by local governments and the incentives they generate for local public officials to be 
more accountable (Careaga and Weingast, 2003; Singh and Srinivasan, 2006). The design of the transfer 
systems has significant implications for the fiscal incentives within decentralized systems, as it may alter 
the fiscal decisions of recipient governments. One of the adverse effects of transfers which is widely 
recognized in the literature is “the Flypaper effect”. It refers to the assumption that increases in equalizing 
transfers tend to stimulate more spending than do comparable increases in local tax revenues (Hines and 
Thaler, 1995; Inman, 2008; Turnbull, 1998). The second adverse effect is that transfers may be “gap-
filling”, meaning that central government bails out local governments in fiscal distress. Local governments 
with larger deficits receive larger transfers relaxing their budget constraint, giving them incentives to 
spend beyond their revenues. To avoid this gap filling issue, local governments need to face a ‘hard 
                                                        
2 Following the classification methods proposed in the literature by Boadway and Shah (2007). 
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budget constraint’. Therefore, they should be able to increase or decrease expenditures only by increasing 
or decreasing their local own revenues in such a way that citizens can make them accountable for their 
decisions. 
On the revenue side, transfers may create inefficiencies in tax administration and tax effort of recipient 
local governments (Dahlby, 2002; Tanzi, 1996). Several studies have tested the effect of central transfers 
on local revenue collection.  
The SGFF literature argues that equalizing transfers that are negatively related or weakly positively 
related to local revenue collection give local governments poor fiscal incentives to foster local economic 
development. Dependence on central transfers compromises local government’s autonomy in setting 
policies in accordance with local preferences. It also gives to the central government the capacity to 
threaten local jurisdictions that deviate from its desired policies by reducing transferred revenues. Local 
governments that rely heavily on transfers tend to be less accountable to citizens, to be less efficient in 
levying taxes and providing public goods (Moore, 2008; Bird, 2010; Weingast, 2009). In a context of 
informational asymmetries, equalizing transfers that are inversely related to the tax base or to some 
measure of tax capacity, will create an incentive for the recipient government to modify its tax and fiscal 
policies in ways that allow it to receive larger equalization transfers, or that prevent it from losing them. 
Similarly, Bordignon & al. (2001) argue that asymmetric information between central and local 
governments tends to drive local governments to under-tax or overspend to capture more equalizing 
transfers.  
Furthermore, Caldeira & Rota-graziosi (2014) find a “crowding-in” effect of intergovernmental transfers 
on local own revenues, meaning that central transfers increase local tax revenues. They develop a 
“virtuous cycle” model, which explains how the central transfers can positively affect local revenue 
collection.
3
. In fact, intergovernmental transfers alleviate the revenue constraints of local governments 
allowing them to improve their ability to provide public goods and services and to strengthen their 
institutional capacity to raise taxes. In turn, improving tax collections increases vertical accountability, tax 
compliance and citizens’ willingness to pay taxes and fees. This crowding-in effect is conditional to the 
allocation of intergovernmental transfers to the effective provision of public goods and services instead of 
tax reliefs. 
The impact of intergovernmental transfers on local tax effort has been empirically investigated in a 
developed country context, but given the lack of data on local public finances, this type of study rarely 
involves developing countries. The empirical findings about the relationship between central transfers and 
                                                        
3 “A virtuous circle may be at play where central grants increase local public spending, which improves private 
income and/or voluntary tax compliance, and consequently local own revenue”(see Caldeira and Rota-graziosi, 2014, 
page 7) 
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the incentives they create for revenue mobilization are inconclusive and differ from country to country. 
Different transfers programs may have different effects and the results depend on the institutional design 
in the country.  
A seminal paper by Correa and Stelner (1999) addressed this issue for Latin American countries; they find 
the evidence of a disincentive effect of fiscal transfers on local tax effort. Liu and Zhao (2011) highlight 
the negative effect of formula-based transfers that aim to reduce regional fiscal disparities on provincial 
tax efforts in China using a panel data from 1995 to 2007. Zhuravskaya (2000) examines this question for 
Russian fiscal system and shows that any increase in local government’s own revenue is almost entirely 
offset by lowering conditional shared revenues. Russian local governments are then unable to benefit from 
an increase in their local tax effort, and therefore have no incentives to expand it. For the Indian local 
governments, the incentive effect of unconditional fiscal transfers on their own tax revenue has been 
discussed by Rajaraman & Vasishtha 2000. They conclude that transfers from the center are significantly 
and negatively associated with states own-revenue. In the African context, Mogues and Benin (2012) 
investigate the way in which conditional transfers affect internally generated revenues and funds in Ghana. 
Their results show that the flow of all grants taken together discourages internally generated revenues and 
funds collection.  
On the reverse, some recent empirical studies find that central transfers have crowding in effect rather than 
crowding out effect on local revenue generation. Dahlberg & al. (2008) have investigated econometrically 
the potential endogeneity of unconditional central transfers and found evidence of a positive effect of 
intergovernmental transfers on local taxes and local tax revenues in Swedish municipalities. Knight (2002) 
concludes that the endogeneity can explain the empirical findings of crowding-out effects. Similar 
findings of incentive effects are found by Caldeira and Rota-Graziosi (2014) for Benin. By analyzing the 
effect of unconditional central grants shared according to population criteria on local own revenue, they 
conclude that there is a positive impact. 
This paper contributes to the Second Generation of Fiscal Federalism (SGFF)
4
 literature. Using a unique 
database on Moroccan municipalities and controling for the endogeneity problem; this paper is the first 
attempt in the literature to test empirically the incentive effects of the two types of transfers: unconditional 
transfer allocated (shared) according to a formula and conditional transfer allocated on an ad-hoc basis.  
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the tax structure of Moroccan 
municipalities and describes the intergovernmental transfers system. Section 3 describes the empirical 
model for determining the incentives effect that intergovernmental transfers have on local own revenue at 
municipal level. The results are discussed before concluding in Section 4. 
                                                        
4
 Second generation fiscal federalism (SGFF) has begun to emerge in the last decade with Oates (2006) and 
Weingast, (2009) . 
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2.  BACKGROUND AND TAX STRUCTURE OF MOROCCAN MUNICIPALITIES  
 
Three administrative levels represent the Moroccan decentralized system; they have legal personality, 
financial autonomy and elected assemblies responsible for managing their affairs democratically. The 
municipalities named “communes” are the third and last administrative subdivision after prefectures and 
regions; they are 1503, including 221 urban municipalities and 1282 rural municipalities. The municipality 
is held by a municipal council elected for six years. The municipal council is responsible for resolving all 
issues related to economic and social development of the municipality in accordance with the guidelines 
and objectives set by the national program. 
 It decides to make or participate in urban restructuring programs, habitat programs ensuring the 
preservation and promotion of local architecture character. It is responsible for managing local public 
services, particularly in the electricity and water sectors, and urban transport supply. The municipal 
council also deals with the collection and treatment of household waste and contributes to the realization, 
maintenance and management of cultural and sports facilities. He initiates all actions necessary for the 
promotion of social, cultural and sports activities. He finally participates to the implementation of 
national, regional or local fight against illiteracy. The central government transfers other responsibilities to 
the municipal council like the maintenance of schools and health centers, conducting reforestation 
programs, implementation and maintenance of training centers and infrastructure equipment. 
To deal with all of their responsibilities and expenditures needs, municipalities have resources coming 
from land and property taxes, local taxes and fees, borrowing resources, tax sharing resources and others 
specific to some municipalities with past surpluses or royalties from natural resources.  
In respect to local taxes, there are on one hand taxes collected by the municipal council (Own local taxes); 
the rate and the base of these taxes are specific to each municipality and fixed by the municipal council. 
They include a large set of taxes concerning essentially public domain usage, public transport, building 
operations, beverage, tourism, etc. More specifically, the tax on undeveloped land levied on undeveloped 
urban lands situated within the perimeters of urban municipalities; The tax on construction operations 
applies to construction, reconstruction and expansion or any operation that requires a building permit; the 
tax on parceling operations applied to any action of property parceling payable by the beneficiary of the 
authorization to subdivide; The beverage tax due by the operators of cafes, bars and tea rooms and in 
general by any debiting drinks for consumption on site; the Tourist tax levied on tourist accommodation 
establishments and coming in addition to the price of the room; The tax on mineral and table water due by 
companies delivering mineral water or table water in the form of bottles; The tax on public passenger 
transport levied on public transports such as taxis and buses according to their territorial exploitation; and 
finally the tax on the extraction of quarry and mineral products applied on the quantities of products 
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extracted from quarries located within the jurisdiction of the municipality. This tax is due by the 
authorized operator. 
Table 1: Distribution of local own revenues in million dirhams 
 
  2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Total local own revenues 
 
1930 2100,99 2372,05 2488,54 2717,67 
mean 
 
1,45 1,59 1,71 1,85 2,01 
s.d 
 
(6,25) (7,96) (8,58) (8,04) (8,61) 
% Of total revenues  14.08% 13.90% 13.91% 15.12% 13.48% 
Local taxes 
 
369 398,90 1 005,75 1 198,52 1 422,25 
mean 
 
0,28 0,30 0,73 0,89 1,05 
s.d 
 
(1,85) (2,31) (5,24) (5,03) (5,33) 
Tax on municipal products 
 
742 796,83 330,19 284,53 319,78 
mean 
 
0,56 0,61 0,24 0,21 0,24 
s.d 
 
(3,1) (3,7) (1,68) (1,35) (1,58) 
Heritage tax  
 
819 899,46 1 024,73 997,24 978,36 
mean 
 
0,62 0,68 0,74 0,74 0,73 
 s.d   (2,07) (2,54) (2,19) (2,38) (2,27) 
     Source: General Treasury of the Kingdom. Authors calculations in million dirhams, 2005 constant currency. 
 
On the other hand, three taxes are supported by the central tax administration for the municipality - “ceded 
revenues” hereafter - they include residential property tax collected only in urban municipalities, the tax 
on communal services, and the patent taxes. These taxes are closely linked to the territory of the 
municipality; they are raised on the rental value of buildings within the jurisdiction of the municipality. 
The central tax administration retains 10% at source to face expenses engaged for the collection of these 
taxes and allocates the remaining 90% of the revenues collected to the municipalities. The rate and the 
base for these taxes are defined annually by the finance act.  
Table 2: Distribution of ceded revenues in millions dirhams 
 
  2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
Total ceded revenues  1580 1811 1888 1482 1966 
mean  1,18 1,37 1,37 1,10 1,46 
s.d  (7,29) (9,47) (8,98) (7,07) (9,87) 
% Of total revenues  11.53% 11.99% 11.06% 9.01% 9.77% 
Patent tax  486,00 511,21 556,01 490,39 770,91 
mean  0,38 0,40 0,42 0,38 0,58 
s.d  (2,40) (0,25) (2,58) (2,32) (3,95) 
Residential property tax  287 337,90 358,65 156,45 129,54 
mean  0,20 0,24 0,25 0,11 0,09 
s.d  (1,41) (2,02) (1,89) (1,25) (0,77) 
Tax on municipal services  804,00 962,39 977,29 830,73 1068,95 
mean  0,56 0,67 0,68 0,57 0,73 
s.d  (3,98) (5,04) (4,80) (4,08) (5,42) 
Source: General Treasury of the Kingdom. Authors calculations in million dirhams, 2005 constant currency.  
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Finally, tax sharing resources are determined as a share of VAT collected at national level and are 
composed of two types. First, unconditional transfers
5
 are allocated to all municipalities according to an 
explicit Formula using objective and quantitative criteria to allocate 18% of VAT collections. It gives 
weight to three criteria including a constant part for all municipalities, indicators of fiscal capacity 
mobilization, and tax effort (Table 4). The goal being to reduce horizontal imbalances and to offset the 
mismatch between local expenditures responsibilities and local revenues by rewarding municipalities that 
have made an effort to improve their own resources collection and to provide them with some positive 
incentives to increase the overall level of revenue mobilization.  
Table 3: Allocation criteria of Unconditional formula based VAT transfers 
                     
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                  Source: Information Bulletin of the Moroccan General Direction of Local Communities  
 
Second, conditional transfers representing 5% of VAT collections are allocated to nearly 200 
municipalities each year. These transfers are allocated for specific purposes such as assisting 
municipalities with significant investment needs. They allow supporting infrastructure construction, social 
and urban development; environmental protection; providing emergency funding for natural disasters or 
epidemics. During the time under study only 200 municipalities benefited from this transfer. Conditional 
transfers are completely discretionary and closely related to bargaining power of municipalities. 
Our empirical model considers these two types of transfers and excludes ceded revenues. Conditional 
transfers are undoubtedly the most discretionary and the less predictable for Moroccan municipalities; 
therefore they are more likely to exhibit perverse fiscal incentives on local revenue generation. 
Unconditional transfers are on the other side a stable source of revenue for Moroccan municipalities and 
aims to encourage them to generate more local own revenue.  
 
 
 
                                                        
5
 Unconditional transfers aim to be a stable source of revenue for Moroccan municipalities. However, it has been 
demonstrated that this transfer is influenced by political consideration especially in the year of local election (El 
Khdari, 2015).  
 
 
 
Allocation criteria 
 
 
Lump sum part 
Capacity 
mobilization 
Tax effort 
A
R
E
A
 
URBAN 15,5% 69% 15,5% 
RURAL 30% 60% 10% 
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Additionally municipalities can borrow from the “Fonds d'Equipement Communal” (FEC), a bank under 
the supervision of the central government and the main lender to local communities. The FEC contributes 
to strengthening local expertise and promoting local development and investment.  
On average over the 5 years, each municipality generated 13 million dirhams annually of total revenues 
including 14% of own local taxes, 11% of ceded revenues, 40% of tax sharing resources (unconditional 
and conditional transfers) and 7% of borrowing resources. Local resources represent a small and a lower 
part of total revenues compared to external funds coming from tax sharing transfers and borrowing 
resources. Moroccan municipalities are obviously heavily dependent on transfers from central 
government. However, the composition of these municipal revenues didn’t change significantly over the 
period of study.  
 A quick look at the distribution of revenue shows an important difference between municipalities (Graph 
1 in Appendix). In absolute term, the average total income is 14 times greater in urban municipalities than 
in rural ones and 23 times for own local revenues. It is not unusual to find such disparities between richest 
and poorest places especially in developing countries; more urbanized municipalities have greater taxable 
capacities and stronger administrative means. In relative term, the share of local own taxes and ceded 
revenues in total revenue for urban municipalities is 15.4% and 15.2% respectively while it represents 
9.15% and 3% for rural municipalities. Moreover, an important component of rural revenue comes from 
Table 4: Distribution of intergovernmental transfers in millions dirhams 
 
    2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 
VAT 
 
32607 37842,95 47151,67 56017,68 49893,75 
% GDP 
 
6,18 6,99 8,50 9,72 8,30 
Total revenues 
 
13700 15103,87 17078,78 16468,25 20110,78 
Mean  10,30 11,42 12,33 12,26 14,95 
  
     
Total conditional transfers 
 
326 352 484 574 924 
mean 
 
0,96 0,98 1,22 1,87 2,65 
s.d 
 
(1,82) (1,87) (2,88) (4,85) (8,87) 
%  total revenues 
 
2,38 2,33 2,83 3,48 4,59 
% VAT   1 0,93 1,03 1,02 1,85 
 
      
Total  unconditional  transfers 
 
4 030 4 105 4 554 4 584 5 798 
mean 
 
3,09 3,16 3,32 3,42 4,30 
s.d 
 
(7,04) (6,75) (7,46) (6,89) (9,42) 
%  total revenues 
 
29,42 27,18 26,67 27,83 28,83 
% VAT   12,36 10,85 9,66 8,18 11,62 
Source: General Treasury of the Kingdom. Authors calculations in million dirhams, 2005 constant currency. 
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tax sharing resources, which represent slightly less than half of all revenues; urban municipalities are 
however less dependent on transfers with a share of 27% of total revenue. 
 
3. ESTIMATION FRAMEWORK 
a. Data 
The database used for the analysis is unique and unexplored; it contains comprehensive information on 
Moroccan municipalities’ public finances. The panel data obtained from three different organizations 
covers a period of 5 years (2005-2009) and over 90% of existent Moroccan municipalities at the time of 
the study. The data on the finances of municipalities were collected from the General Treasury of the 
Kingdom (TGR), one of the most important departments of the Ministry of Finance, which manages all 
financial and accounting flows of the State and local authorities. There is information on local revenues 
with disaggregated sources (own local revenues, loans, reassigned resources, etc.), data on local spending 
by economic classification (capital expenditures, personnel, recurrent, debt, etc.). The second data source 
is on the socio-economic and demographic variables at municipal level. It comes first from population 
census data (2004) performed every decade by the High Commission for Planning (HCP), secondly from 
database on living standards, poverty, vulnerability and inequality at municipal level for the years 2004 
and 2007 also provided by HCP. The data includes annual observations from 2005 to 2009 for nearly 1330 
Moroccan municipalities. Moroccan municipalities are predominantly rural; we have about 200 urban 
municipalities and 1130 rural municipalities. 
The basic question this paper investigates is whether two different types of transfers from central 
government influence the local revenue generation. To do so the following model is applied to a panel of 
Moroccan municipalities over the period 2005-2009: 
 
  ln⁡(Rit) = ln⁡(Trit)α + ln⁡(EXPit−1)β + Xitγ + θi + δt + εit  (1) 
Where Rit is the log of per capita local own-revenue of municipality i at year t, the explanatory variable of 
interest Trit is the log of conditional or/and unconditional transfers in per capita terms, received by 
municipality i at time t from central state
6
. EXPit-1 is a vector of two types of past expenditures of local 
government including the log of lag personnel and capital expenditures of the municipalities. The dynamic 
relationship between local government revenues and expenditures has been investigated by Dahlberg and 
Johansson (1998) in Sweden and recently by Mogues and Benin (2012) in Ghana. Their main findings 
were that expenditures are positively related to own-source revenues, suggesting that an increase in local 
                                                        
6 Table 3 describes the variables used for the empirical analysis. 
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expenditures in a given time period may exert pressure to expand revenues in subsequent time periods, 
especially when the local government has a hard budget constraint
7
. 
 Xit is a vector of several explanatory variables commonly used in the literature on the determinants of 
local revenue. These include variables on financial characteristics: The log of lagged total debt in per 
capita terms is included to explore the relevance of the intertemporal budget constraint. 
We also explore the relevance of economic and demographic variables to explain local own-revenue 
mobilization. The population size is included in the regression to control for municipality-size. The 
municipal poverty rate is used as proxy for income levels because information on income is unavailable at 
municipal level and the unemployment rate. The income base for taxation is likely to be lower in 
municipalities with a larger poverty and unemployed workforce therefore these variables are expected to 
have a negative effect on revenue mobilization (Mogues and Benin, 2012). 
To take into account the sectorial composition of revenue we include the proportion of the municipal 
population working in the agriculture sector as a proxy for the composition of economic sectors. Typically 
agriculture activities are difficult to tax in developing countries where a large part of activities are on 
small scale basis or for subsistence consumption then it may be politically infeasible to tax the sector 
(Agbeyegbe et al., 2004). This sector is not taxable in Morocco then municipalities with large agriculture 
sector would have less tax revenues. Hence, a negative relationship is expected between the proxy of 
agriculture sector and revenue mobilization in Moroccan municipalities (Karagoz, 2013; Srivastava et al., 
2012). Additionally, to account for unobserved specific characteristics and external chocks affecting the 
municipalities in the same way, regional-specific dummies θi and time-specific dummies δt are included. 
Finally εit is the error term.  
We use the sample of municipalities receiving both conditional and unconditional transfers, and 
alternatively the sample of municipalities receiving unconditional transfers only. The test of mean 
differences shows that there isn’t a significant difference between the two samples according to our main 
variables expect for capital expenditures and ceded revenues. The significant difference in capital 
expenditures between the two samples can be explained by the fact that municipalities which beneficiate 
from conditional transfers have more investment need the reason why they receive conditional transfers. 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                        
7 This result refers to the “spend-tax” hypothesis, the literature that tests this and other hypotheses related to the 
intertemporal dynamics between revenues and expenditures is reviewed by Payne (2003). 
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Table 5: Comparison of means for unconditional sample and both conditional and 
unconditional sample 
    Both Unconditional Difference 
Sample size 
 
1133 5594 
 
Own local revenues (pc) 
 
103.8 97.99 -5.8 
Unconditional transfers (pc) 
 
317.35 317.02 -0.33 
Capital expenditures (pc) 
 
210.06 147.13 -62.93*** 
Ceded revenues 
 
44.42 29.57 -14.85** 
Personnel expenditures (pc)   216.54  203.01 -13.53 
Source: Authors calculations     
 
b. Empirical model 
 
The model is estimated using fixed effect (FE), random-effect (RE) and Hausman–Taylor (HT) estimators. 
The fixed effects estimator provides consistent estimations but the coefficients of time-invariant regressors 
are not identified because they are eliminated from the regression. Even if these variables are not of 
primary interest in the model it is important to include them to control for the determinants of revenue 
mobilization. The random-effects model on the other hand allows us to keep these variables but assumes 
that all regressors are uncorrelated with the unobserved effects, which is a strong assumption that can lead 
to inconsistent results. 
The Hausman taylor approach is typically recommended for panel data with time-invariant variables and 
correlated unit effects. It is based upon an instrumental variable (IV) estimator that corrects for the 
correlation between regressors and the specific effects and additionally enables the coefficients of time-
invariants regressors to be estimated (Hausman and Taylor, 1981; Wooldridge, 2002). Therefore it 
addresses limitations that would arise with both fixed-effects and random-effects estimators. It does so by 
distinguishing between uncorrelated regressors with the specific effects (exogenous) and those potentially 
correlated (endogenous). It additionally distinguishes between time-varying and times invariant variables. 
The Hausman–Taylor estimation uses both the between and within variations of the strictly exogenous 
variables as instruments for the endogenous variables. More specifically, exogenous regressors included in 
the model are used as instruments for the time-invariant regressors correlated with the individual effects. 
The method requires that the number of time-varying exogenous regressors be at least as large as the 
number of time invariant endogenous regressors, which is the case in our model. The choice of the strictly 
exogenous regressors is a testable hypothesis and an over identification test is generally applied, the 
choice between the FE and HT estimators being based upon the standard Hausman test (Hausman, 1978). 
The HT results will be compared to the FE and RE estimations in the next section to give an insight on 
how the results are affected by the estimator used.  
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An important issue, addressed in the literature by Dahlberg and al. (2008) and Knight (2002), is the risk of 
endogeneity of transfers relatively to local own revenues. Basically equalizing or formula based grants, 
which rely on tax effort or fiscal capacity in their criteria, are endogenous by nature. Unconditional 
transfers in Morocco are allocated according to formula that includes tax effort measured by local own 
taxes in its criteria; it is set to incentivize revenue mobilization by recipient municipalities. In fact, this 
variable is by nature endogenous. Therefore per capita local own revenue and per capita unconditional 
transfers are likely to be jointly determined, creating a simultaneity bias. While earmarked grants set on a 
discretionary basis are allocated according to specific needs rather than the level of collected revenue and 
independently from the revenue level of the municipality. The only channel through which one could 
suspect of endogeneity is that the higher the level of generated income in the municipality the less it will 
rely on transfers to finance its projects. Consequently, the level of local own-revenue could possibly affect 
the level of received transfers indicating that estimates from an OLS specification would very likely be 
biased. To mitigate this potential simultaneity bias we assess the effect of transfers (unconditional and 
conditional) on local own-revenues using fixed-effects two-stage least square (2SLS) estimation approach. 
This approach allows us to use external instruments to correct for the endogeneity. However, it requires 
the existence of instruments correlated with the endogenous variables (per capita unconditional 
/conditional transfers) but not directly with per capita local own revenues. Therefore, the variables that are 
most notably uncorrelated with local own revenue and correlated with unconditional transfers are political 
indicators. According to the literature on the political determinants of intergovernmental transfers, the 
instruments for unconditional transfers are a dummy for central elections, the number of elected officials 
in the municipality and the difference of percentage between the first and the second party in the last 
elections as proxy of swing municipalities. El Khdari (2015) shows that the formula doesn’t eliminate 
political motivations and finds that there is a tactical distribution regarding the unconditional transfers in 
Morocco. The central government favors swing municipalities: the larger the difference in votes between 
the parties arriving first and second in the most recent elections, the lesser the unconditional transfers 
toward those municipalities. Moreover, Worthington & Dollery (1998) argues that the year of central 
election would have a negative effect on central transfers. Intergovernmental transfers are less productive 
in central election comparing to the local election to influence votes and purchase political capital. 
For the regression with conditional transfers, two instruments that we believe correlated with conditional 
transfers and indirectly correlated with local own revenues are used. While this kind of grant intends to 
help municipalities with high investment and expenditure needs, the instrumental variables are the per 
capita grants to local organizations and total expenditures net of debt, grants and capital expenditures. 
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c. Estimation results 
 
This section begins with a comparison between the fixed effect, random effect and Hausman Taylor 
estimates, followed by an examination of instrumental variables estimates. Table 6 presents the results of 
the fixed effect, random effect and Hausman Taylor estimators. While fixed effect estimator doesn’t 
present results for time invariant regressors, a sequence of tests is conducted to find the appropriate model. 
Therefore we implement the Random effect estimator and use Hausman test to evaluate its relevance and 
test the presence of correlation between regressors and unobserved effects.  
The Hausman test rejects the null hypothesis under which the Random effect estimator is efficient and 
consistent. The hausman test is also implemented to test the validity of the Hausman Taylor estimator and 
the quality of instruments used in the model. The test fails to reject the null hypothesis; the Hausman-
Taylor estimator is then consistent and efficient compared to the fixed effect estimator.   
The empirical findings don’t support a significant effect of conditional transfers on revenue mobilization 
for Moroccan municipalities neither with FE nor HT estimations. Regression (2) tests the effect of 
unconditional transfers on local own revenue per capita. The results for HT estimation reveal that 
unconditional transfers have a significant incentive effect on revenue mobilization at 10% level. An 
increase of 10% in unconditional transfers to local governments is associated with an approximately 3,8% 
increase in local own-revenue. However, we cautiously conclude on the effect of unconditional transfers 
and conditional transfers on local own-revenue since we didn’t correct for the endogeneity problem.  
Overall, the coefficient estimates for control variables are in accordance with the literature and have the 
expected sign. Municipalities engaging large personnel and capital expenditures will not especially collect 
more own-revenue the subsequent year but municipalities with large debt will increase significantly their 
own revenues in the subsequent year. The results confirm convergence toward the intertemporal budget 
constraint; a higher debt shows a positive impact on local own revenue in the subsequent year.  
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Table 6: Effect of conditional and  unconditional transfers on per capita own revenue 
 
        (1)   (2)   (3) 
    FE RE HT   FE RE HT   FE RE HT 
Conditional transfer it  
-0.018 -0.0109 -0.0152 
     
-0.018 -0.0122 -0.0160 
 
 
(0.0110) (0.0107) (0.0107) 
     
(0.012) (0.0105) (0.0105) 
Unconditional transfer it      
0.092 0.381*** 0.389* 
 
0.074 0.384*** 0.368* 
 
     
(0.352) (0.105) (0.201) 
 
(0.271) (0.105) (0.198) 
Capital EXP it-1  
0.022 0.0685*** 0.0276 
 
0.025 0.0653*** 0.0295 
 
0.0223 0.0645*** 0.0271 
 
 
(0.018) (0.0190) (0.0188) 
 
(0.017) (0.0182) (0.0187) 
 
(0.0201) (0.0182) (0.0186) 
Personnel EXP it-1  
-0.069 0.229** -0.0647 
 
-0.068 0.182** -0.0656 
 
-0.069 0.182** -0.0663 
 
 
(0.067) (0.0941) (0.0424) 
 
(0.067) (0.0895) (0.0422) 
 
(0.045) (0.0895) (0.0421) 
Debt it-1  
0.044** 0.0559** 0.0703*** 
 
0.039* 0.0457** 0.0572** 
 
0.0432* 0.0475** 0.0599** 
 
 
(0.0217) (0.0180) (0.0195) 
 
(0.023) (0.0180) (0.0191) 
 
(0.0245) (0.0177) (0.0191) 
Poverty rate it  
0.004 -0.0132*** 0.00301 
 
0.004 -0.0136*** 0.00299 
 
0.004 -0.0136*** 0.00308 
 
 
(0.005) (0.00371) (0.00508) 
 
(0.005) (0.00368) (0.00506) 
 
(0.005) (0.00368) (0.00504) 
Population size it   
0.0829 -0.0559 
  
0.240*** 0.126 
  
0.235*** 0.0993 
 
  
(0.0591) (0.107) 
  
(0.0586) (0.161) 
  
(0.0586) (0.159) 
Agriculture it   
-2.743*** -3.081*** 
  
-2.353*** -2.627** 
  
-2.357*** -2.713** 
   
(0.578) (0.837) 
  
(0.584) (0.885) 
  
(0.584) (0.879) 
Unemployment it 
  
-0.0106 0.00753 
  
-0.00253 0.0121 
  
-0.00155 0.0115 
   
(0.0259) (0.0382) 
  
(0.0269) (0.0372) 
  
(0.0267) (0.0371) 
Area it (=1 if Urban)   
0.505** 0.890*** 
  
0.289** 0.628** 
  
0.287** 0.649** 
 
  
(0.156) (0.176) 
  
(0.143) (0.233) 
  
(0.144) (0.231) 
Constant 
 
3.898*** 2.243** 4.937*** 
 
3.335* -1.250 0.894 
 
3.500** -1.171 1.352 
 
 
(0.332) (0.925) (1.211) 
 
(1.928) (0.995) (2.745) 
 
(1.476) (0.994) (2.708) 
Year effect 
 
Yes Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes Yes 
Municipal effect 
 
Yes Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes Yes 
 
Yes Yes Yes 
Hausman test 
  
221.08 1.19 
  
178.42 6.38 
  
202.18 6.38 
 
  
0.0000 0.9912 
  
0.0000 0.4960 
  
0.0000 0.6044 
No. Of Obs 
 
1133 1133 1133 
 
1133 1133 1133 
 
1133 1133 1133 
R squared   0.103 0.4247 
  
0.099 0.4269 
  
0.103 0.4270 
 
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses 
All local public finance variables are measured in log and per capita terms of local currency 
*Statistical significance at 10%, **Statistical significance at 5%, ***Statistical significance at 1% 
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The control variables that emerge from our analysis as having a significant effect are the proxy of 
agriculture sector and the area dummy. The results suggest a strong negative and significant relationship 
between the share of agriculture and per capita local own revenue. This could be explained by the fact that 
this sector is not taxable in Morocco and that a large agricultural sector may also reduce spending on 
goods and services that generate own-revenue for municipalities. Finally, controlling for the area of the 
municipality shows that urban municipalities collect more local own revenues compared to rural 
municipalities. Our results are in accordance with the findings of Mogues and Benin (2012) in Ghana, Liu 
and Zhao (2011) in China, Zhuravskaya (2000) in India, Panda (2009), Rajaraman and Vasishtha (2000) 
in India among others who show that transfers from central government discourage local own revenue 
mobilization. 
However, as mentioned by Dahlberg and al. (2008), Knight (2002) among others, traditional estimations 
may lead to biased interpretations because of the endogeneity of transfers’ indicators. Therefore, table 7a 
and 7b present the results of the fixed effect two square least square estimator using instrumental 
variables.  
After controlling for endogeneity (Table 7a, 7b), the analysis shows that conditional transfers have a 
positive and significant effect at a 5% level. This effect is not significant when controlling for conditional 
and unconditional transfers jointly. This result is not surprising as conditional transfers are exactly pointed 
in time and not recurrent, redistributed for specific investment needs. Therefore, local governments 
know they can't rely on this type of transfers to finance their long-term programs unless they match the 
central government plans.   
Concerning unconditional transfers, the effect  on  local  own  revenues  per  capita  is  strongly significant 
in our different specifications, meaning that unconditional transfers encourage local revenue generation. 
Even if the municipality doesn’t know the exact amount it will receive, as the central government doesn’t 
follow the formula, this type of transfers remains predictable and represents a stable source of revenue. 
Moreover, the central government uses this type of transfers to give municipalities incentives to increase 
the overall level of revenue mobilization by including a proxy of tax effort and revenue mobilization in the 
formula and by announcing that the more the tax effort of the municipality the more the amount of 
unconditional transfers it will receive. In table 7b the robustness of this result is tested using three 
different samples. The effect of unconditional transfers remains robust and strongly positive in the 
different estimations.  
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Table 7a: Effect of conditional and unconditional transfers on per capita own revenue  
 
  (1) (2) (3) 
  1st stage Main 1st stage Main 1st stage Main 
  
        
Conditional 
transferit 
Unconditional  
transferit 
  
Conditional transfer it  
0.123** 
    
0.046 
 
 
(0.061) 
    
(0.065) 
Unconditional transfer it    
1.175*** 
  
0.928*** 
 
   
(0.253) 
  
(0.276) 
Capital EXP it-1 -0.071 0.065** 0.016** 0.0197 -0.093 0.015** 0.0319 
 
(0.072) (0.022) (0.007) (0.019) (0.074) (0.006) (0.022) 
Personnel EXP it-1 -0.075 -0.0322 0.075*** -0.117* -0.054 0.065*** -0.099 
 
(0.194) (0.076) (0.014) (0.0647) (0.190) (0.018) (0.068) 
Debt it-1 0.199** -0.002 -0.021** 0.046* 0.205** -0.018** 0.033 
 
(0.090) (0.026) (0.010) (0.025) (0.090) (0.010) (0.027) 
Central election 
  
-0.055*** 
 
-0.107  -0.042*** 
 
 
  
(0.012) 
 
(0.140) (0.011) 
 
Elected officials it   
0.044*** 
 
0.066 0.040*** 
 
 
  
(0.006) 
 
(0.044) (0.005) 
 
Swing it   
 -0.004*** 
 
-0.003 -0.003*** 
 
 
  
(0.0006) 
 
(0.006) (0.0006) 
 
Grants to local organizations it 3.673***    
3.552***  0.123* 
 
 
(0.691) 
   
(0.686)  (0.067) 
 
Other expendituresit 1.156***    
1.127*** -0.173 
 
 
(0.234) 
   
(0.232) (0.022) 
 
Municipal effect  Yes  Yes   Yes 
Year effect 
 
No 
 
No 
  
No 
No. Of Obs  796   796     796 
Underidentification test  
 
27.637 
 
111.965 
  
19.768 
P-Value 
 
0.0000 
 
0.0000 
  
0.0006 
Overidentification test 
 
1.891 
 
1.182 
  
2.268 
P-Value 
 
0.1690 
 
0.5537 
  
0.5188 
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses 
All local public finance variables are measured in log and per capita terms of local currency 
*Statistical significance at 10%, **Statistical significance at 5%, ***Statistical significance at 1% 
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Table 7b: Effect of unconditional transfers on per capita own revenue (3 Samples) 
 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
  1st stage Main 1st stage Main 1st stage Main 
              
Unconditional transfer it 1.175*** 
 
0.735*** 
 
0.823*** 
  
(0.253) 
 
(0.116) 
 
(0.0953) 
Capital EXP it-1 0.016** 0.0197 0.002 0.0385** 0.002 0.0281** 
 
(0.007) (0.0196) (0.004) (0.0128) (0.004) (0.00955) 
Personnel EXP it-1 0.075*** -0.117* 0.082*** -0.0643 0.080*** -0.0610* 
 
(0.014) (0.0647) (0.016) (0.0478) (0.010) (0.0356) 
Debt it-1 -0.021** 0.0464* -0.008 0.0146 -0.006 0.0232** 
 
(0.010) (0.0248) (0.005) (0.0149) (0.004) (0.0110) 
Central election it -0.055*** 
 
-0.068*** 
 
-0.068*** 
 
 
(0.012) 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.006) 
 Elected officials it 0.044*** 
 
0.047*** 
 
0.043*** 
 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.003) 
 
(0.002) 
 Swing it -0.004*** 
 
-0.004*** 
 
-0.004*** 
 
 
(0.0006) 
 
(0.0003) 
 
(0.0002) 
 Municipal effect  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year effect 
 No 
 
No 
 
No 
No. Of Obs 
 
796 
 
3058 
 
4351 
Underidentification test  
 
111.965 
 
423.854 
 
687.140 
P-Value 
 
0.0000 
 
0.0000 
 
0.0000 
Overidentification test 1.182 
 
2.824 
 
4.048 
P-Value 
 
0.5537 
 
0.2437 
 
0.1321 
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses 
All local public finance variables are measured in log and per capita terms of local currency 
*Statistical significance at 10%, **Statistical significance at 5%, ***Statistical significance at 1% 
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This effect is higher in the subsample of municipalities that received at least once both conditional and 
unconditional transfers during the period under study. 
The variable ceded revenues is included in table 3a and 3b (appendix) to control for the other resources 
available for the municipalities. A municipal which expect an important amount of ceded revenues could 
be less motivated to collect local revenue while it covers its expenditures with other sources of revenues. 
As expected, the effect of this variable is negative and has a disincentive effect on revenue mobilization. 
Adding this variable confirm the robustness of our previous results. Those results of incentive effects are 
close to those found by Caldeira and Rota-graziosi (2014) in the case of Benin and Buettner (2006) and 
Dahlberg et al. (2008) for Germany and Sweden. 
Estimating the incentive effects of the two types of transfers on local own revenue generation by area is 
used to test the robustness of previous findings. Given that most Moroccan municipalities are located in 
rural area, we need to test the robustness of our findings and verify that rural municipalities do not 
significantly influence our results. Table 8 presents an estimation of the incentive effects of the two types 
of transfers on local own revenue mobilization for urban and rural area using fixed effects two square least 
square estimator. The results confirm that conditional transfers have a non-significant effect neither on 
urban municipalities nor on rural municipalities. 
According to unconditional transfers, the effect on local own revenue remains significant and positive 
with different coefficients for urban and rural municipalities. An increase of 10% in unconditional 
transfers for urban municipalities is associated with an increase of 6,9% of local own revenue. The effect 
of this type of transfers is greater for rural municipalities where an increase of 10% increases local own 
revenue by 11,1%. 
Rural municipalities are often staffed with low-skilled employees who do not have financial literacy and 
the expertise to manage public finances properly. Collecting local taxes and fees can be very costly 
because of the absence of monitoring and enforcement structures. Moreover, taxpayers cannot be 
identified and are not willing to pay taxes because of the poor quality of the service provided by local 
governments. Therefore, tax non-compliance is widespread due to the generally weak level of trust in 
local government institutions. Central transfers act as a leverage allowing local governments to increase 
their own revenues by improving their financial capacity to deliver public services and collect taxes. 
 
.   
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Table 8: Effect of conditional and unconditional transfers on per capita own revenue by 
area 
 
  
URBAN 
 
RURAL 
    1st stage Main   1st stage Main 
    
Conditional 
transferit 
Unconditional 
transferit 
    
Conditional 
transferit 
Unconditional 
transferit 
  
Conditional transfer it  
 
-0.004 
   
0.083 
  
 
 
(0.031) 
   
(0.088) 
Unconditional transfer it  
 
0.699*** 
   
1.110** 
    
(0.182) 
   
(0.359) 
Capital EXP it-1 
 
-0.258 0.011 -0.015 
 
-0.082 0.006 0.047* 
  
(0.175) (0.017) (0.025) 
 
(0.081) (0.007) (0.028) 
Personnel EXP it-1 0.431 0.481** -0.117 
 
-0.088 0.049*** -0.094 
  
(1.629) (0.208) (0.161) 
 
(0.193) (0.013) (0.073) 
Debt it-1 
 
-0.170 0.028 -0.005 
 
0.241** -0.032*** 0.044 
  
(0.177) (0.029) (0.042) 
 
(0.099) (0.008) (0.039) 
Poverty rate it 
 
0.002 -0.017** -0.005 
 
-0.007 -0.013*** 0.011* 
  
(0.079) (0.005) (0.007) 
 
(0.017) (0.002) (0.006) 
Central election it 
 
-0.652* -0.088*** 
  
-0.088  -0.090*** 
 
  
(0.357) (0.029) 
  
(0.173) (0.014) 
 Elected officials it -0.096 0.026* 
  
0.087* 0.026*** 
 
  
(0.127) (0.015) 
  
(0.0523) (0.005) 
 Swingit 
 
0.043* -0.003 
  
 -0.008 -0.003*** 
 
  
(0.024) (0.002) 
  
(0.007) (0.0006) 
 Grants to local 
organizations it 
 7.105***  -0.067 
  
2.979*** 0 .00002 
 
  
(1.897) (0.212) 
  
(0.727) (0.061) 
 Other expenditures it 
 
2.273*** -0.057 
  
0.952*** -0.011 
 
  
(0.654) (0.072) 
  
(0.245) (0.020) 
 Municipal effect   Yes   Yes 
Year effect 
   
No 
   
No 
No. Of Obs 
   
165 
   
632 
Underidentification test    10.803        15.408 
P-Value 
   
0.0289 
   
0.0039 
Overidentification test 
  
 3.009 
   
 0.454 
P-Value 
   
0.3902 
   
0.9288 
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses  
All local public finance variables are measured in log and per capita terms of local currency 
*Statistical significance at 10%, **Statistical significance at 5%, ***Statistical significance at 1% 
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4. CONCLUSION 
 
In most decentralized countries, intergovernmental transfers are an important element in the relationship 
between the central and lower levels of government Hence, policymakers must bring a lot of attention to 
the design of the transfer system to take advantage of decentralization by giving enough autonomy to local 
governments in generating their own revenue, and therefore avoiding any negative and disincentive effects 
that may arise from a poorly defined system.  Moroccan municipalities are relatively dependent on 
transfers from central government, as 29% of their revenues come from unconditional transfers and 10% 
from conditional transfers. 
Using a unique and rich public finance dataset on Moroccan municipalities, this paper estimates 
empirically the effects of conditional ad-hoc transfers and unconditional formula based transfers on local 
revenue mobilization effort. Our findings support the existence of a significant incentive effect of 
unconditional transfers and less robust effect of conditional transfers, suggesting that per capita 
unconditional transfers from the central government have a positive impact on per capita local own-
revenue mobilization. These results show some consistency with previous findings in the literature on 
incentive effects of intergovernmental transfers. Governments while designing transfers should take into 
account the fiscal incentives they may create for local officials especially when local governments can 
perceive transfers as a windfall resource. Conditional transfers that are program-based and allocated for 
specific purposes on an ad-hoc basis, are the less recommended in the literature. First they are more 
sensible to political manipulation and local bargaining. Second, if a municipality knows she can rely on 
transfers to finance its projects, it will be less motivated to collect revenue to meet its expenditure needs. 
The Moroccan intergovernmental transfers system includes a large part of unconditional transfers shared 
on a formula basis and to a lesser extent, but not negligible, conditional transfers set on an ad-hoc basis. 
The first recommendation to improve this transfers system effectively is to reduce the dependence on 
transfers, especially the earmarked ones, and to use these resources to increase local governments’ 
capacity or at least the general- purpose transfers, to give local governments more autonomy in handling 
local issues. 
The second recommendation concerns the design of formula used for unconditional transfers. The 
formula already includes a tax effort indicator, which is a good way to encourage revenue mobilization. 
However, the way it is defined points out the problem of inequalities between the municipalities. 
According to the formula, the more revenues the municipality collects the more unconditional 
transfers it gets, meaning that richer municipalities are getting richer widening the inequalities between 
endowed and less endowed municipalities. Therefore, the third recommendation to make this transfers 
system more efficient and more incentivizing is to give it two components: an incentivizing part and a 
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redistributive one. First, by giving more weight to the tax effort indicator in the formula. Second, by 
correlating negatively the proxy of fiscal capacity to the amount of transfers to be received. 
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APPENDIX 
 
 
Table 1: Variables’ definition and data source 
 
  
  
Variable Description Data source 
Local own-revenue  
Sum of three taxes collected by the municipality in year t 
(2005 to 2009) in per capita terms and local currency. 
General Treasury of the 
Kingdom (TGR) 
Conditional transfers 
Per capita conditional ad-hoc VAT transfers received by 
municipality in year t (2005 to 2009) in local currency. 
General Treasury of the 
Kingdom (TGR) 
Unconditional transfers 
Per capita formula based VAT transfers received by 
municipality in year t  (2005 to 2009) in local currency 
General Treasury of the 
Kingdom (TGR) 
Capital expenditures 
Lag of capital expenditures net of acquisitions engaged by 
the municipality in year t (2005 to 2009) in per capita and 
local currency. 
General Treasury of the 
Kingdom (TGR) 
Personnel expenditures 
Per capita salaries of employees in the municipality in year t  
(2005 to 2009) and local currency. 
General Treasury of the 
Kingdom (TGR) 
Debt 
Per capita debt stock in the municipality in year t  (2005 to 
2009) and local currency. 
General Treasury of the 
Kingdom (TGR) 
Poverty rate Poverty rate in the municipality in 2004 and 2007 
Database on living standards, 
poverty, vulnerability and 
inequality, HCP 
Population size Number of people leaving in the municipality in 2004 
Population census data of 
2004, HCP 
Unemployment  Unemployment rate in the municipality in 2004 
Population census data of 
2004, HCP 
Agriculture 
Share of the population working in the agriculture sector in 
2004 
Population census data of 
2004, HCP 
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Table 2: Descriptive Statistics of the main regressors (2005-2009) 
 
 
    
Variable Mean Std dev. Min Max 
Total local revenues 13 45 0 1 200 
Local own-revenue 1,8 8,5 0 207 
Conditional Transfers 1,6 5,3 0 120 
Unconditional Transfers 3,7 8,1 0 180 
Capital Expenditures 2,4 11,8 0 480 
Personnel Expenditures 2,8 8,6 0 160 
Debt 0,7 2,9 0 90,8 
Poverty rate 17.37 9.96 0.25 80.21 
Population size 15726 29249 131 461677 
Agriculture share 18.63 10.45 0 51.03 
Unemployment 414 1311 16 20741 
Source: Authors calculations. 
    All local public finance variables are measured in millions dirhams 
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Graph 1: Distribution of our main variables 
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Table 3a: Effect of conditional and unconditional transfers on per capita own revenue  
 
  (1) (2) (3) 
  1st stage Main 1st stage Main 1st stage Main 
  
        
Conditional 
transferit 
Unconditional 
transferit 
  
Conditional transfer it  
0.121** 
    
0.0346 
 
 
(0.0607) 
    
(0.0647) 
Unconditional transfer it    
1.143*** 
  
0.980*** 
 
   
(0.234) 
  
(0.274) 
Ceded revenues -0.081 -0.0867 0.113*** -0.214** -0.060 0.101*** -0.195** 
 
(0.189) (0.0725) (0.023) (0.0809) (0.191) (0.021) (0.0844) 
Capital EXP it-1 -0.074 0.0628** 0.018** 0.0143 -0.095 0.018** 0.0234 
 
(0.073) (0.0220) (0.006) (0.0202) (0.075) (0.006) (0.0231) 
Personnel EXP it-1 -0.074 -0.0328 0.076*** -0.115* -0.053 0.066*** -0.104 
 
(0.194) (0.0780) (0.012) (0.0692) (0.189) (0.016) (0.0719) 
Debt it-1 0.195** -0.00811 -0.013 0.0312 0.202** -0.011 0.0231 
 
(0.092) (0.0264) (0.010) (0.0227) (0.093) (0.010) (0.0254) 
Central election it   
-0.061*** 
 
-0.095 -0.049*** 
 
 
  
(0.012) 
 
(0.140) (0.011) 
 
Elected officials it   
0.043*** 
 
0.070  0.040*** 
 
 
  
(0.006) 
 
(0.044) (0.005) 
 
Swing it   
 -0.004*** 
 
 -0.003 -0.004*** 
 
 
  
(0.0006) 
 
(0.006) (0.0006) 
 
Grants to local 
organizations it 
3.704*** 
   
3.584*** 0.129** 
 
 
(0.685) 
   
(0.681) (0.065) 
 
Other expenditures it  1.165***    
1.137*** 0.021 
 
 
(0.232) 
   
(0.230) (0.022) 
 
Municipal effect  Yes  Yes   Yes 
Year effect 
 
No 
 
No 
 
 No 
N. Of Obs   796 
 
796 
  
796 
Underidentification test  28.302 
 
 114.353 
  
20.195 
P-Value 
 
0.0000 
 
0.0000 
  
0.0005 
Overidentification test 
 
2.299 
 
 0.697 
  
1.094 
P-Value   0.1295   0.7059     0.7785 
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses 
     
All local public finance variables are measured in log and per capita terms of local currency 
 
 *Statistical significance at 10%, **Statistical significance at 5%, ***Statistical significance at 1% 
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Table 3b: Effect of  unconditional transfers on per capita own revenue (3 Samples) 
 
  (1) (2) (3) 
  1st stage Main 1st stage Main 1st stage Main 
              
Unconditional transfer it  
1.143*** 
 
0.744*** 
 
0.824*** 
 
 
(0.234) 
 
(0.113) 
 
(0.0926) 
Ceded revenues it 0.113*** -0.214** 0.901*** 0.0226 0.901*** -0.000728 
 
(0.023) (0.0809) (0.013) (0.0347) (0.013) (0.0276) 
Capital EXP it-1 0.018** 0.0143 0.001 0.0387** 0.002 0.0281** 
 
(0.006) (0.0202) (0.005) (0.0128) (0.003) (0.00955) 
Personnel EXP it-1 0.076*** -0.115* 0.077*** -0.0663 0.077*** -0.0612* 
 
(0.012) (0.0692) (0.016) (0.0475) (0.010) (0.0354) 
Debt it-1 -0.013 0.0312 -0.006 0.0154 -0.004 0.0231** 
 
(0.010) (0.0227) (0.005) (0.0148) (0.004) (0.0110) 
Central election it -0.061***  
-0.073*** 
 
-0.074*** 
 
 
(0.012) 
 
(0.007) 
 
(0.006) 
 
Elected officials it 0.043***  
0.047*** 
 
0.043*** 
 
 
(0.006) 
 
(0.003) 
 
(0.002) 
 
Swingit -0.004***  
-0.004*** 
 
-0.004*** 
 
 
(0.0006) 
 
(0.0003) 
 
(0.0002) 
 Municipal effect  Yes  Yes  Yes 
Year effect 
 
No 
 
No 
 
No 
N. Of Obs 
 
796 
 
3057 
 
4349 
Underidentification test  
 
114.353 
 
436.741 
 
703.113 
P-Value 
 
0.0000 
 
0.0000 
 
0.0000 
Overidentification test 
 
0.697 
 
2.827 
 
4.014 
P-Value 
 
0.7059 
 
0.2433 
 
0.1344 
Notes: Robust standard errors are in parentheses 
All local public finance variables are measured in log and per capita terms of local currency 
*Statistical significance at 10%, **Statistical significance at 5%, ***Statistical significance at 1% 
 
